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strapping/unstrapping the cargo. At the next stop, he felt increased pain with pinning the 
swing door back and while climbing into the tractor. 
The next day, Mr. Travis informed his driver manager that he hurt his shoulder at 
work and needed medical treatment. 3 That same day, he went to Fast Pace Urgent Care 
Clinic and stated that he was "not sure what he has done, yesterday notice[ d] tightness in 
[right] shoulder." He reported that he drove an eighteen-wheeler and related his 
complaints to getting in and out of the truck or loading it. In his injury report, he noted 
his injury occurred on November 3 at 10:00 a.m. and caused by "normal job duty" such 
as "climbing into truck or trailer," "entering or exiting truck or trailer," or "tightening 
straps." 4 
He ultimately came under the care of Dr. Sean Grace, who noted, "[D]uring the 
course of his work as a truck driver he was lifting the trailer door in the back and felt 
sharp pain his upper arm and shoulder area." Dr. Grace recommended an MR 
arthrogram, but Carter denied the claim before it was administered. Despite Carter's 
denial of treatment, Mr. Travis returned to Dr. Grace, who confirmed that his right-
shoulder injury was directly related to the work incident and indicated he would likely 
benefit from surgery. 
Carter denied Mr. Travis's claim, arguing his description of injury varied between 
his injury reports, medical records, affidavit, and testimony. It also asserted that 
Tennessee has no jurisdiction, introducing an agreement signed by Mr. Travis at the time 
of hire in which he agreed that all claims would be governed by the Indiana Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
In its Expedited Hearing Order, the Court held Mr. Travis presented sufficient 
evidence that he would likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits in proving that: 
3 Carter filed Mr. Travis's claim with the Workers' Compensation Board of Indiana. It gave notice to 
Indiana of its inability to determine liability and requested additional time on two separate occasions. On 
November 17, 2017, Carter noted it was "trying to determine cornpensability, claimant does not know 
how he strained his shoulder." On December 4, 2017, Carter explained it was "REQUESTING 
MEDICAL INFORMATION FROM THE PROVIDER SO WE CAN DETERMINE 
COMPENSABILITY." (Emphasis in original). 
4 The parties introduced three reports of injury. The Indiana First Report of Employee Injury, prepared by 
Carter Safety Director Rick Wisener, noted a November 3, 2017 injury date at I 0:00 a.rn. and an 
unknown cause of injury to the right shoulder. The IAIBC First Report of Injury, prepared by Claims 
Adjuster Arny Miller, noted a November 3, 2017 injury date at 10:00 a.m. and indicated, "CLMT WAS 
EITHER ENTERING AND EXITING TRUCK AN SPRAINED RIGHT SHOULDER. UNKN 
DETAILS." (Emphasis in original). The Employee's Report of Injury, prepared by Mr. Travis, also 
noted a November 3, 2017 injury date at I 0:00 a.m. and indicated injury caused by "normal job duty" 
while he was "climbing into truck or trailer," or "entering or exiting truck or trailer, or tightening straps." 
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1) Carter's forum-selection clause was unenforceable and he was entitled to seek 
benefits under Tennessee law. 
2) He suffered an injury caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, identifiable 
by time and place of occurrence. 
3) His injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment 
and caused the need for medical treatment. 
4) He is entitled to medical and temporary partial disability benefits. 
5) Carter wrongfully failed to timely initiate benefits that it owed, and its failure to 
timely initiate benefits justified an award of attorney's fees and costs at this 
interlocutory stage under section 50-6-226( d)(b )(1 ). 
On appeal, the Appeals Board affirmed this Court's conclusions on all counts 
except as to the award of attorney's fees and costs. The Appeals Board concluded this 
Court failed to consider whether this case falls within the limited circumstances 
supporting an award of attorneys' fees and costs at an interlocutory stage. It therefore 
vacated that part of the Expedited Hearing Order and remanded for further consideration. 
On remand, the parties appeared before the Court on January 4, 2019. Upon their 
agreement, the Court set Mr. Travis' deadline to file his fee petition and brief on January 
25, Carter's deadline to file its responsive brief on February 22, and the hearing date on 
February 28. Before the deadline to file and again during the hearing, Carter moved for a 
continuance, which the Court denied. 
Mr. Travis's Request for Attorney's Fees 
Mr. Travis argued that this is an appropriate case for awarding attorney's fees and 
costs at the interlocutory stage. Following an Expedited Hearing, this Court ruled that 
Carter's failure and refusal to timely initiate benefits was incorrect. The Appeals Board 
affirmed. He asserted this case falls within the extremely limited circumstances 
identified by the Appeals Board. 
Concerning the uncertainties inherent in litigation, Mr. Travis argued no 
uncertainties exist in this case concerning the Indiana forum-selection clause, as it was 
not enforceable when signed and that will not change with the passage of time. 
Addressing the limited issues typically addressed at Expedited Hearings, section 
50-6-239(d)(l) authorizes the Court to determine issues concerning the provision of 
temporary disability and medical benefits, and section 50-6-226(d)(l)(B) authorizes the 
Court to award costs and fees on finding that these benefits were owed. 
Considering that discovery and medical proof is often incomplete, Mr. Travis 
submitted proof from Fast Pace and Dr. Grace that substantiated a right-shoulder injury 
caused by work. Carter focused on Mr. Travis's purported inability to identify a specific 
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incident, but it ignored section 50-6-102(14 ), which defines accidental injury as one 
caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily out of and in the course 
and scope of employment. These findings are unlikely to change with additional 
discovery or medical proof. 
Regarding the standard of proof, Mr. Travis asserted Carter denied his claim on an 
election of remedies/forum-selection clause and inability to identify a specific incident, 
ignoring that he reported a set of incidents. The Court's findings on these issues were 
based on an interpretation of the law, not on how changing facts could apply to the law. 
Finally, analyzing the Court's ability to make different determinations at a 
Compensation Hearing, Mr. Travis argued that the Court's and Appeals Board's opinions 
on compensability were based on an interpretation of the law and the law is unlikely to 
change between the Expedited and Compensation Hearings. 
Mr. Travis argued that the Court should give meaning to section 50-6-
226( d)(l )(B) by awarding costs and fees. To deny his request will encourage Carter to 
continue to erroneously, incorrectly, and inconsistently fail to timely initiate benefits and 
further limits attorney involvement on behalf of injured employees. 
Mr. Travis's attorney, Brad C. Burnette, submitted an affidavit addressing his 
experience, the time required and work involved, and nature of the fee arrangement with 
Mr. Travis. Attorney Burnette asserted he entered into a contingency fee agreement with 
Mr. Travis and charged an hourly fee under section 50-6-226(d)(l)(B) of $350 for 
himself and $90 for his paralegal. Attorney Burnette submitted detailed fee entries 
totaling 78.10 in attorney hours and 10.10 in paralegal time, for a total of$28,244. 
Mr. Travis also submitted the affidavit of Attorney Jonathan Doolan, who stated, 
within a reasonable degree of professional certainty, that the time dedicated by Attorney 
Burnette was reasonable, necessary, within the common and customary practice of 
competent attorneys practicing in workers' compensation, and consistent with the 
Supreme Court Rules regarding fees. 
Carter opposed Mr. Travis's fee petition on grounds that its failure to initiate 
benefits was not erroneous, incorrect, or otherwise inconsistent with the law or facts at 
the time the decision was made. Carter argued that Mr. Travis repeatedly indicated 
uncertainty in what caused his alleged injury and failed to identify a specific incident, or 
set of incidents, identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Carter further argued that 
Dr. Grace based his causation opinion on an unreported description of injury. It also 
argued that Indiana law governed this claim. It concluded that its failure to initiate 
benefits was reasonable. 
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Carter further asserted that an award of attorney's fees is premature, given that 
medical treatment remains incomplete. It argued that diagnostic testing has not been 
completed and Mr. Travis "may have a SLAP tear or rotator cuff tear or he may have a 
non-work-related tumor, or some other non-work-related condition." It asserted that 
considering attorney's fees before a confirmed diagnosis is premature and presents a 
great risk to employers. It asked the Court to deny the request, or in the alternative to 
delay its decision until the case is more fully developed. 
Finally, although Carter offered no specific objections to the Attorney Burnette's 
affidavit and fee entries, it asked the Court to limit the fees to a reasonable hourly rate 
and reasonable time. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
The General Assembly amended the Workers' Compensation Law in 2016 to 
authorize trial courts to award attorneys' fees and costs under section 50-6-226(d)(l)(B) 
when an employer wrongfully denies benefits or fails to timely provide benefits. 
The 2016 version of this subsection provided in part: 
[T]he court of workers' compensation claims may award reasonable 
attorneys' fees and reasonable costs ... when the employer: 
Wrongfully denies a claim by filing a timely notice of denial, or fails to 
timely initiate any of the benefits to which the employee is entitled under 
this chapter, including medical benefits under § 50-6-204 or temporary or 
permanent disability benefits under § 50-6-207, if the workers' 
compensation judge makes a finding that such benefits were owed at an 
expedited hearing or compensation hearing. 
(Emphasis added). The 2016 amendment to subdivision ( d)( 1 )(B) applied to injuries 
occurring on or after July 1, 2016. 
In Thompson v. Comcast Corp., 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *26 
(Jan. 30, 2018), the Appeals Board determined that the word "wrongfully" as used in the 
statute above applied only to the denial of a claim but not to the failure to timely initiate 
benefits. 
In 2018, the Generally Assembly revised this subsection, which now reads: 
In addition to attorneys' fees provided for in this section, the court of 
workers' compensation claims may award reasonable attorneys' fees and 
reasonable costs ... when the employer: 
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Wrongfully denies a claim or wrongfully fails to timely initiate any of the 
benefits to which the employee or dependent is entitled under this chapter, 
including medical benefits under § 50-6-204, temporary or permanent 
disability benefits under § 50-6-207, or death benefits under § 50-6-210 if 
the workers' compensation judge makes a finding that the benefits were 
owed at an expedited hearing or compensation hearing. For purposes of 
this subdivision (d)(l)(B), "wrongfully" means erroneous, incorrect, or 
otherwise inconsistent with the law or/acts. 
(Emphasis added). 
In Andrews v. Yates Services, LLC, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 22, at 
* 8-9 (May 8, 2018), the Appeals Board noted that the recently-enacted amendment 
applied only to injuries occurring on or after April 18, 2018. 
While the 2018 version is not applicable to the present case-Mr. Travis's injury 
date is November 2-3, 2017-the 2018 version is informative. In Yates, the Appeals 
Board found the 2018 version instructive when determining the definition of "wrongfully 
denies" as used in the 2016 version of section 50-6-226(d)(l)(B). Id. at *9. The Appeals 
Board concluded that "wrongfully denies" in the earlier version requires a finding that an 
employer's denial was erroneous, incorrect, or otherwise inconsistent with the law or 
facts to support a claim for reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses at the time the 
decision was made. Id. at * 10, 13. However, the Appeals Board cautioned, "[A] 
decision to award attorneys' fees and expenses at an interlocutory state of a case should 
be made only in extremely limited circumstances." See Thompson, at *28-29. 
Here, using the 2016 version, the Court must determine whether, at the time the 
decision was made, Carter "wrongfully denie[ d] a claim by filing a timely notice of 
denial, or fail[ ed] to timely initiate any of the benefits to which [Mr. Travis] is entitled 
under this chapter, including medical benefits under § 50-6-204." Carter gave notice to 
Indiana of its inability to determine liability and requested additional time on two 
separate occasions and noted it was "trying to determine compensability." However, 
there is no evidence that Carter filed a notice of denial under either Indiana or Tennessee 
law, so the first part of section 50-6-226( d)(l )(B) is inapplicable. 
The Court is therefore left with determining whether, at the time the decision was 
made, Carter failed to timely initiate any of the benefits to which Mr. Travis was entitled. 
The Court considers the information available to Carter at the time it failed to provide 
medical and temporary disability benefits. The Court holds that Carter's failure to timely 
initiate benefits was incorrect, erroneous, and inconsistent with the law or facts for 
several reasons. 
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First, section 50-6-114 states no contract or agreement shall in any manner operate 
to relieve any employer of any obligation created by the Tennessee Workers' 
Compensation Law. The forum-selection clause, standing on its own, was therefore void 
from the outset. 
Second, even if the forum-selection clause were enforceable, Mr. Travis did not 
make an election of remedies to recover under Indiana law. Signing the agreement at the 
time of hire was a condition of employment. After his work injury, he neither actively 
pursued nor knowingly or voluntarily received benefits under Indiana law. 
Third, Mr. Travis timely reported a work injury, but Carter failed to timely initiate 
treatment without sufficient reason. Ms. Riley suggested he seek treatment at an urgent-
care clinic, which he did. Fast Pace referred Mr. Travis to an orthopedic physician, who 
determined that his right-shoulder injury was directly related to the work incident. 
However, Carter failed to authorize care at Fast Pace or with Dr. Grace, nor did it provide 
a panel of physicians. Carter offered no countervailing testimony to refute Mr. Travis's 
testimony or Dr. Grace's opinions. 
Fourth, Mr. Travis unequivocally testified that he provided his restrictions to Ms. 
Riley, and Carter failed to accommodate his restrictions or return him to work. Thus, the 
Court finds Carter wrongfully failed to timely initiate medical and temporary disability 
benefits that it owed. 
The Court must now address whether this case falls within the "extremely limited 
circumstances" under Thompson. In Thompson, the Appeals Board cautioned trial courts 
to consider: 
The uncertainties inherent in litigation, the limited issues typically 
addressed at expedited hearing, the fact that discovery and medical proof 
often incomplete at an interlocutory stage of a case, the standard of proof 
that applies at expedited hearings, and the fact that a trial judge's 
determination at an interlocutory hearing are subject to change at any time 
prior to the entry of a final compensation hearing order. 
Id. at *26. The Appeals Board affirmed the award of attorney's fees in Thompson 
because the employer declined to authorize treatment based solely on its own 
interpretation of the medical records and without seeking an expert opinion to support its 
denial. 
Considering the Thompson factors, the Court concludes Carter's failure to timely 
initiate benefits justifies an award of attorney's fees and costs at this interlocutory stage 
and in these extremely limited circumstances. Here, just as in Thompson, Carter declined 
to authorize treatment or provide temporary disability benefits based on its own 
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interpretation that Mr. Travis's reports of injury were inconsistent and without seeking an 
expert opinion to rebut Dr. Grace's causation opinion and support its denial. 
Mr. Travis and the medical records consistently demonstrated that he injured his 
right shoulder at work. Carter offered no evidence to rebut Mr. Travis's description of 
his injury. Mr. Travis credibly offered reasonable explanations for any inconsistencies in 
the medical records or his injury report. Carter also did not offer any expert medical 
opinion to support its refusal to authorize medical treatment despite receiving timely 
notice of an injury and its driver manager instructing Mr. Travis to seek medical 
attention. 
Carter also failed to initiate benefits under Tennessee law claiming Indiana law 
governed. Moreover, Carter did not provide benefits under Indiana law. The forum-
selection clause was not enforceable when it was signed, and this Court, affirmed by the 
Appeals Board, concluded that Tennessee has jurisdiction. 
Instead, Carter delayed took steps at every stage to delay Mr. Travis's claim. 
Twice, it sought extensions under Indiana law to provide benefits, and twice it was 
denied. Despite no evidence to rebut Mr. Travis's testimony or Dr. Grace's causation 
opinion, Carter continued to deny the claim and failed to initiate benefits, forcing Mr. 
Travis to file a Petition for Benefit Determination and Request for Expedited Hearing. 
Even after agreeing to the deadlines regarding the fee petition, Carter twice sought 
extensions from this Court seeking additional delay. 
As the Appeals Board noted, uncertainties exist in litigation. Issues at an 
Expedited Hearing often differ from those at a Compensation Hearing, and different 
burdens of proof apply. However, while discovery and medical proof continue to 
develop after an Expedited Hearing, an employer cannot be allowed to deny benefits and 
delay recovery without cause, relying solely only upon its own interpretation of the 
employee's description of injury and medical records. Additional discovery and medical 
proof, a higher burden of proof, and the passage of time will not change the fact that 
Carter's failure to initiate benefits was erroneous, incorrect, and inconsistent with the law 
and facts at the time the decision was made. 
The Workers' Compensation Law requires an employer to provide an injured 
employee with medical treatment upon timely notice of a work injury. When an 
employer fails to timely initiate the benefits to which the employee is entitled, the 
General Assembly has determined that an employer may be held liable for the injured 
employee's attorney's fees following an Expedited Hearing. The General Assembly 
made no change to the attorney's fees provision when it revised section 50-6-
226(d)(l)(B) in 2018. The purpose of the statute is defeated if an injured employee must 
wait until a Compensation Hearing to recover attorney's fees incurred for recovering 
temporary disability and medical benefits. Accordingly, the Court concludes Mr. Travis 
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is entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs under section 50-6-226(d)(b)(l) at this 
interlocutory stage and in these extremely limited circumstances. 
Next, the Court must determine whether Mr. Travis's attorney's fees are 
reasonable, considering the factors in Tennessee Supreme Court Rules 8, Rules of 
Professional Conduct l.5(a). 
Mr. Travis's attorney attested that the time, labor, and skill required to prepare and 
try this matter are supported by the time entries. He argued that, through his 
representation, Mr. Travis was finally paid back temporary disability benefits that he was 
owed, and Carter paid his outstanding medical bills related to his limited treatment. The 
time required with these efforts was significant and precluded or delayed other work 
available. Further, he and his staff are experienced in workers' compensation. Attorney 
Doolan's affidavit provides that the time dedicated by Attorney Burnette was reasonable, 
necessary, within the common and customary practice of competent attorneys practicing 
in workers' compensation, and consistent with the Supreme Court Rules regarding fees. 
Other than Carter's counsel's argument, it offered no countervailing evidence to 
support its contention that Mr. Travis's fees were unreasonable under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
Therefore, considering the affidavits of Attorneys Burnette and Doolan, the 
detailed fee entries, and the claim as a whole, the Court concludes Mr. Travis 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that his attorney's fee is reasonable. 
Thus, he shall receive fees totaling $28,244 under subsection 226( d)(l )(B). 
Unless interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed, compliance 
with this Order must occur no later than seven business days from the date of entry of this 
Order as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(3). The Insurer or 
Self-Insured Employer must submit confirmation of compliance with this Order to the 
Bureau by email to WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov no later than the seventh business 
day after entry of this Order. Failure to submit the necessary confirmation within the 
period of compliance may result in a penalty assessment for non-compliance. 
It is so ORDERED. 
ENTERED March 13, 2019. 
PAMELA B. JOHNSON, 
Court of Workers' Compensation Claims 
APPENDIX 
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Technical Record: 
1. Petition for Benefit Determination 
2. Dispute Certification Notice 
3. Additional Issues, Objections, and/or Defenses submitted by Employee 
4. Additional Issues, Objections, and/or Defenses submitted by Employer 
5. Request for Expedited Hearing 
6. Affidavit of Fred Travis, III 
7. Notice of Objection to Expedited Hearing on the Record 
8. Employer's Response to Request for Expedited Hearing 
9. Expedited Hearing Order 
10. Expedited Hearing Transcript 
11. WCAB Opinion 
12. Order Setting Deadlines to File Briefs and Oral Argument 
13. Employee's Brief Supporting Request for Attorney's Fees and Affidavits of 
Attorneys Burnette and Doolan 
14. Employer's Motion to Compel and for Continue 
15. Employee's Response to Motion to Compel and for Continue 
16. Order Denying Motion to Continue 
17. Employer's Brief on the Attorney Fee Issue 
Exhibits: 
1. Affidavit of Fred Travis, III 
2. Indiana Workers' Compensation First Report of Work Injury 
3. IAIABC Release 1 First Report of Injury Form 
4. Third Coast Underwriters Employee's Report of Injury 
5. Notice of Inability to Determine Liability/Request for Additional Time - filed 
November 20, 2017 - Rejected 
6. Notice of Inability to Determine Liability/Request for Additional Time - filed 
December 4, 2017 
7. Agreement as to Jurisdiction and Notice as to Indiana Workers' Compensation 
Law 
8. GPS Log ofNovember 2-3, 2017 
9. Cellular Phone Record of Injury Report, dated November 4, 2017 
10. Weather History for November 3, 2017 
11. Medical Records of Fast Pace Medical Clinic, PLLC 
12. Medical Records of Dr. Sean Grace, Tennessee Orthopaedic Clinic 
13. Medical Expense of DJO Global 
14. Affidavit of Brad C. Burnette 
15. Detailed Time Entries 
16. Affidavit of Jonathan Doolan 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the Remand Expedited Hearing Order was 
sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on March 13, 2019. 
Name Certified Fax Email Service sent to: 
Mail 
Brad C. Burnette, x bradburnette@foxandfarleylaw.com 
Employee's Attorney 
J. Allen Brown, x allen@jallenbrownpllc.com 
Employer's Attorney 
~ SJAV#;JJ~ PENNY HRUM, Court Cl~
WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov 
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